Investor sentiment and bidder announcement abnormal returns by Danbolt, Jo et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Danbolt, J., Siganos, A., and Vagenas-Nanos, E. (2015) Investor sentiment and 
bidder announcement abnormal returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, 33, pp. 164-
179. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/107511/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 17 July 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
1 
 
Investor Sentiment and Bidder Announcement  
Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
Jo Danbolt 
University of Edinburgh, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JS, UK 
Email: Jo.Danbolt@ed.ac.uk 
 
Antonios Siganos 
University of Glasgow, University Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK 
Email: antonios.siganos@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
Evangelos Vagenas-Nanos* 
University of Glasgow, University Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK 
Email: evangelos.vagenas-nanos@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
 
 
*Corresponding Author: Adam Smith Business School, Accounting and Finance Division, 
University of Glasgow, West Quadrangle, Main Building, University Avenue, Glasgow G12 
8QQ, Scotland, E-mail: Evangelos.Vagenas-Nanos@glasgow.ac.uk, Tel: +44 (0)141 330 
7677, Fax: +44 (0)141 330 4442 
 
 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to an anonymous referee, Jeffry Netter (the editor), 
Ilanit Gavious, Marc Goergen, Alan Goodacre, Dimitris Petmezas, Bill Rees, Lucia Spotorno, 
Yannis Tsalavoutas, Patrick Verwijmeren, Betty Wu, participants at the BAFA (London) 
2014, EFMA (Rome) 2014, and WFC (Venice) 2014 conferences, and seminar participants at 
the Universities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Stirling for helpful comments on previous 
versions of this paper. Jo Danbolt holds the Baillie Gifford Chair in Financial Markets, and 
his research is partially funded by a Baillie Gifford endowment held by the University of 
Edinburgh Business School. Baillie Gifford has no role in or influence over the research 
conducted. 
 
2 
 
Investor Sentiment and Bidder Announcement  
Abnormal Returns 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We introduce the significance of a direct sentiment proxy as an explanatory variable of bidder 
announcement returns. We argue that sentiment subconsciously influences investor 
perception of potential merger synergies and risks, and therefore relates to bidder abnormal 
returns. We proxy daily sentiment based on Facebook status updates across seventeen 
international markets and show that there is a positive relation between sentiment and bidder 
announcement returns. In line with behavioral literature stating that sentiment more heavily 
influences uninformed traders, this relation is more pronounced in acquisitions with a low 
percentage of blockholder ownership, acquisitions of US public targets, and acquisitions of 
large targets relative to the size of the bidders. Our study goes beyond the conventional 
sentiment and stock market returns literature, uncovering a significant relation between 
sentiment and firm-specific abnormal returns to acquiring companies. 
 
Keywords: Mergers, bidder announcement returns, behavioral finance, investor sentiment. 
JEL classification: G1, G34 
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1. Introduction 
There is extensive literature (e.g., Eckbo, 2009) discussing the relation of acquirer- and deal-
specific characteristics with acquirers’ announcement returns. If investors are rational, in line 
with the expectations of the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama, 1970), the share price 
reaction of the acquiring firm on the announcement date of an acquisition should reflect the 
expected net present value of the acquisition (i.e., the discounted target firm value plus the 
value of potential synergies minus the amount paid to the target company’s shareholders). 
This paper relaxes the assumption of strict investor rationality and argues that a behavioral 
aspect is related with bidders’ short-term wealth effects. Investor sentiment is expected to 
influence investor perception of potential synergies and risks involved in the acquisition, 
leading to an irrational component of the share price reaction. Such misvaluations are 
expected to be of a short-term nature and to be arbitraged away over the days following the 
bid announcement (Officer, 2007). 
A number of psychological studies have shown that sentiment has an impact on 
judgment. Mitchell and Phillips (2007) report that even small changes in sentiment may have 
an impact on neural activation and cognition, such as on participants’ ability to plan, 
memorize, and think creatively. Investors who are in a good mood tend to make more 
optimistic decisions (Wright and Bower, 1992; Bless et al., 1996). A number of studies in the 
field of finance have indeed empirically validated the positive relation of sentiment with 
stock market returns. For example, Edmans et al. (2007) find that sports results are related 
with contemporaneous stock market indexes, in that a country’s win/loss in sports is related 
with a positive/negative corresponding stock market reaction. Palomino et al. (2009) report 
that share prices of winning British soccer clubs overreact to information. Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003) show that abnormal weather conditions are positively related with 
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contemporaneous stock market returns. Kaplanski and Levy (2010) report that aviation 
disasters negatively influence people’s sentiment, and negative stock market returns are 
experienced shortly after, even for companies not affected by the event. The positive relation 
between sentiment and stock returns has also been supported by a number of studies (e.g., 
Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006) that use direct monthly sentiment proxies through surveys, 
such as the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. According to Johnson and 
Tversky (1983) and Loewenstein et al. (2001), sentiment influences not only the judgment of 
favorable future prospects, but also the assessment of risk. Kaplanski et al. (2014) survey 
investors and find that happy investors not only are positive on expected stock returns, but 
also believe that the risks involved are relatively low.  
We hypothesize that for mergers announced on days with optimistic market 
sentiment, investors are subconsciously more likely to overestimate potential synergies and 
underestimate the risks associated with the merger. On counterpart merger announcement 
days with low investor sentiment, investors would subconsciously be pessimistic regarding 
expected synergy benefits and perceive the potential risks of the acquisition to be high. We 
therefore hypothesize that sentiment is positively related to bidder announcement returns. We 
believe this study is the first to explore the relation of a direct sentiment proxy with bidder 
announcement abnormal returns. Note that while prior studies find the overall stock market 
index to be positively correlated with market sentiment, we explore the relation between 
market sentiment and the market’s reaction to firm-specific bid announcements. This study 
thus goes beyond the conventional relation between sentiment and stock returns, and we 
explore bidder abnormal stock returns, in excess of the corresponding stock market returns. 
Uncovering a significant relation between sentiment and the stock market reaction to 
acquisition announcements, this study provides new insights into the relation between 
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sentiment and share returns. Our findings suggest behavioral aspects are related to investors’ 
perceptions of risk and synergies of mergers and acquisitions.    
It may be argued that the shares of merging firms are heavily traded by professional 
investors, and therefore that any irrational component to the share price reaction upon bid 
announcement is unlikely. However, there is evidence to suggest professional investors may 
also be liable to be influenced by sentiment, with e.g., Kaplanski and Levy (2013) reporting 
that US analyst recommendations are influenced by sentiment, and Kling and Gao (2008) 
showing that stock returns and contemporaneous Chinese institutional investor sentiment are 
positively related.1 Professional investors are, though, influenced by sentiment to a lesser 
extent than uninformed traders (e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006). We therefore expect 
any relation between sentiment and bidder abnormal returns to be short-lived, and for there to 
be signs of a reversal of any effect of sentiment on share returns over the days following the 
bid announcement, as any pricing anomaly is exploited by merger arbitrageurs.  
In the main analysis, we use the Gross National Happiness Index (GNH) from 
Facebook to capture sentiment on the days around merger announcements. The GNH index 
offers significant advantages over conventional sentiment indexes.2,3 First, Facebook data is 
available with a daily frequency, which enables us to explore sentiment during merger 
announcements, while conventional sentiment indexes are available on a monthly basis.4 
Second, the GNH index is available for seventeen international markets, including the US 
market, giving an international dimension to the validity of our results. Third, while 
                                                          
1 There is evidence even beyond the finance field that professionals are influenced by non-rational factors. For 
example, Glejser and Heyndels (2001) report that expert judges in the Queen Elisabeth International Music 
Competition tend to award higher marks to musicians that perform later in the competition. 
2 See Siganos et al. (2014) for further details on the merit of GNH as a market sentiment index.  
3 Other commonly used sentiment indexes include the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and 
the Consumer Confidence Index.   
4 Note that the Gallup Economic Confidence Index offers daily US sentiment data. However, Gallup’s coverage 
is shorter in length than that of the GNH, and its coverage is limited to the US market. For robustness, we 
explore US results with Gallup later in the study.   
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traditional sentiment surveys tend to be based on relatively small samples of hundreds or, at 
most, a few thousand respondents, the Facebook GNH index is based on several million daily 
status updates. By 2014, there were almost 1.3 billion active Facebook users worldwide 
(Kuchler, 2014). The index can thus be argued to capture the overall sentiment of a large 
proportion of a country’s population.  
We acknowledge that there may be certain limitations of the Facebook GNH index for 
our research purposes. Facebook users may have been young when Facebook was first 
introduced in 2004, and few are likely to have been investors. However, in later years there 
has been a significant increase in the age profile of users. Kramer and Chung (2011) use a 
sample period between September 2007 and February 2010 and find that over a quarter of 
Facebook users are older than 45, and less than ten percent are teenagers. Recent research 
(Kramer et al., 2014, p. 8788), also using Facebook data, finds “…emotional states can be 
transferred to others via emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same 
emotions without their awareness”. Thus, even if a relatively small proportion of Facebook 
users are investors, it is possible that investors’ sentiment is influenced by that of people 
around them, which arguably may be captured by Facebook, given its very widespread use. 
Indeed, Karabulut (2013) and Siganos et al. (2014) validate the relevance of the Facebook 
sentiment index to capital markets by showing that it is positively related with 
contemporaneous stock market returns. Their findings are consistent with evidence from 
conventional monthly sentiment proxies. There is, thus, prior evidence of sentiment, as 
proxied by Facebook’s GNH index, influencing share prices.  
Our study is the first to use Facebook’s sentiment data within the mergers and 
acquisitions field, looking at the relation between sentiment and bidder abnormal returns. 
However, as a robustness test, we also use the Gallup Economic Confidence Index as a proxy 
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of market sentiment. While also available on a daily basis, the Gallup Index is, however, only 
available for the US and for a slightly shorter time period than the GNH Index. Analysis of 
the US sub-sample using the Gallup Index produces similar results to those obtained using 
Facebook’s GNH, suggesting our results are not driven by the choice of sentiment proxy. 
However, given the larger sample of countries and the longer period of data availability, we 
base our main analysis on the Facebook GNH index data. 
         We use GNH data between September 2007 and March 2012 and empirically support 
that GNH is related with bidder announcement returns.5 The average cumulative abnormal 
returns within a four-day period from the merger announcement day to three days after (0,+3) 
are 2.06 (0.92) percent in the highest (lowest) GNH quartile. The difference in returns 
between the high and low GNH portfolios is economically large and statistically significant at 
the one percent level. Results hold when controlling for a number of variables that have 
previously been found to be related with bidder returns. We estimate bidder abnormal stock 
returns, and therefore our results indicate a relation that goes beyond the typical sentiment 
and stock market returns (e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006). In a further robustness test, 
we find that the relation between sentiment and bidder stock returns is more pronounced 
during the merger announcement period than during a random period prior to the merger 
announcement (such as over the period from day -12 to -10 relative to the day of the bid 
announcement), offering further credence to the suggestion that market sentiment seems to 
influence the stock market reaction to merger announcements.  
In line with our hypothesis, sentiment seems to influence investor perception of 
potential synergies and/or the risk involved in the deal. On days with positive sentiment, 
                                                          
5 In untabulated results, we empirically find that there is no relation between sentiment and target announcement 
returns. Targets experience little, if any, uncertainty relating to their announcement returns, since the majority 
experience significant gains (e.g., King, 2009) and the uncertainty regarding the value of the investment falls 
largely on the bidder. 
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investors would appear to be more likely to overestimate potential synergies and 
underestimate the risks associated with the merger, with the reverse being likely on days with 
negative sentiment. We further find evidence of the positive relation between GNH and 
bidder announcement abnormal returns to at least partially reverse over the days following 
the merger announcements, giving further support to the argument that the reaction to the 
announcement was likely an irrational short-term overreaction to information. 
We further explore sub-samples for which sentiment is expected to have a more or 
less pronounced effect on bidder returns based on prior literature finding that sentiment more 
heavily influences less informed investors (e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006). Potential 
validation would offer further credence to the argument that sentiment is the driver behind the 
key relation reported in the study. We explore the relation between bidder returns and GNH 
in acquisitions by bidders with different levels of blockholder ownership, in acquisitions of 
public versus private target firms, and in acquisitions with different levels of relative target 
size. In particular, we hypothesize that the relation between GNH and bidder returns is more 
pronounced within firms with low levels of blockholder ownership, since small investors 
have been found to be more heavily influenced by sentiment (e.g., DeLong et al., 1990). We 
also hypothesize that the relation is more pronounced within acquisitions of public rather than 
private target firms. Public acquisitions are typically larger transactions and tend to attract 
more media attention (e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009), and small investors are heavily 
influenced by media coverage when selecting firms in which to invest (Barber and Odean, 
2008). Finally, we hypothesize that the relation is stronger if the size of the target is large 
relative to the size of the bidder. Not only are acquisitions of large targets likely to attract 
more media attention, but any behavioral biases in valuing targets can be expected to have a 
larger impact on bidder returns where the target is relatively large. We empirically support 
the above hypotheses.   
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This study contributes to the literature in several ways. We first contribute to the 
behavioral finance literature. While behavioral finance studies (e.g., Edmans et al., 2007; 
Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Siganos et al., 2014) tend to show that sentiment is 
positively related with aggregate stock market performance, we study the relation between 
sentiment and individual firms’ returns, finding sentiment to have a significant relation with 
bidder abnormal returns during their merger announcements. Our results highlight a relation 
beyond the typical sentiment and stock market returns relation reported in previous studies, 
indicating the influence of sentiment on investors’ perception of synergies and risks 
associated with mergers and acquisitions. We also develop predictions, based on behavioral 
literature, as to which takeover transactions are likely to be more affected by sentiment than 
others, and empirically test these predictions. Focusing on the merger context, we show for 
the first time that sentiment has a stronger relation with bidder returns for bidders with a low 
percentage of blockholder ownership, in acquisitions of large targets relative to the size of the 
bidders, and, for the US sub-sample, in acquisitions of public targets. We further contribute to 
the merger literature by empirically validating for the first time the relation of a direct 
investor sentiment proxy on bidder announcement abnormal returns.  
Our study is most closely related with Rosen (2006), who reports that US bidder 
announcement returns are more likely to increase in ‘hot’ merger markets, as defined by 
recent mergers with good announcement performance and periods with good overall stock 
market performance. Both Rosen’s study and ours find that behavioral aspects are related 
with bidder announcement returns. Rosen’s (2006) explanation is that there is momentum in 
investor perception of potential synergies from mergers, implying that the level of optimism 
in a market is related with bidder announcement performance. He finds a short-run 
overreaction for deals announced during hot merger periods, and a long-run price correction, 
and attributes this to investor sentiment. Our study instead uses a direct daily proxy of 
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sentiment across international markets to highlight the importance of sentiment during 
merger announcements on contemporaneous bidder announcement abnormal returns. The 
study is also related to extensions of the neoclassical theory, according to which behavioral 
aspects impact firm managers’ decisions on the timing of mergers and the selected method of 
payment (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-
Kropf et al., 2005; Bouwman et al., 2009). We highlight the significance of investor, rather 
than manager, sentiment on merger share price reactions.     
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our data. 
Section 3 discusses the empirical results on the relation between sentiment and the short-term 
wealth effect of bidders upon their merger announcements. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data description  
We use daily GNH data from Facebook for seventeen international markets between 
September 2007 and March 2012 as our main proxy of market sentiment. The countries 
included are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, the UK and the US.6 
The coverage available from Facebook determines the countries selected and the sample 
period of the study. GNH is estimated by Facebook’s Data Team based on the status updates 
of millions of Facebook users, and the construction of the index is explained in detail in 
Kramer (2010). GNH is a standardized index estimated by Facebook’s Data Team by 
measuring the percentage of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ terms used in Facebook users’ status 
updates. Using Text Analysis and Word Count (TAWC) programs to identify positive and 
                                                          
6 Note that Facebook offers sentiment data for twenty markets. Chile, Colombia and Venezuela are excluded 
since no mergers are available within the requested data restrictions.   
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negative words from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) dictionary, GNH is 
estimated as follows: 
alln
allnin
allp
allpip
ji
xxxx
GNH
,
,,
,
,,
, σσ
−
−
−
=                                                (1) 
where jiGNH , is the sentiment index of country j  at day i , ipx ,  and inx ,  are the average 
positive ( p ) and negative ( n ) words used respectively on day i  in the country, and allpx , , 
allnx , allp,σ , and alln,σ  are the average ( x ) positive and negative words used over the duration 
of the index and the standard deviation (σ ) of those variables. The extreme high and low 10 
percent of the days are excluded by Facebook when estimating allpx , , allnx , allp,σ , and alln,σ  to 
minimize the impact of extreme values. In line with Siganos et al. (2014), we exclude 
observations above the 99th percentile, since these normally relate to messages like “Happy 
Mother’s Day”, which do not necessarily reflect sentiment.  
 We also download from Thomson OneBanker information on acquisitions by bidding 
firms in corresponding countries within the available data periods. For a deal to be included 
in the sample, the bidder needs to be listed and to acquire at least 50 percent of the target’s 
shares. We also require the target company size (deal value) to be at least 1% of the market 
value of the bidder. These data restrictions are commonly used to identify significant 
acquisitions in the merger literature (e.g., Moeller et al., 2004). Eligible firms also have 
available Datastream codes and available returns from Datastream for the interval period 
from the merger announcement to three days after the day of their bid announcements. At 
least one of those daily stock returns should be non-zero for a bidding firm to be included in 
the sample. We use the returns index (RI) datatype from Datastream to incorporate dividend 
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payments to calculate log returns, and we proxy market returns for each of the seventeen 
countries by Datastream’s total market indexes (TOTMK).  
Following prior literature, such as Fuller et al. (2002) and Rosen (2006), we calculate 
abnormal returns as the difference between the return for the bidder and the relevant country 
index return. To measure the short-term wealth effect, we estimate the cumulative abnormal 
returns over a four-day period (0,+3). Since small investors are likely more prone to be 
influenced by sentiment, and it is unlikely that small investors are aware of potential leaks 
prior to merger announcements, our sentiment and stock returns measures commence at the 
day of the merger announcement (day 0). We use a three-day lead to fully capture the share 
price reaction by investors, since small investors may be slow to react to information, and to 
allow for Facebook users updating their status at any time during the day, even after the 
closure of the stock markets.7 In untabulated results, we find that results are similar and the 
conclusions consistent when using alternative periods, such as in the shorter three-day event 
window (0,+2). 
While our focus is on the relation between sentiment and bidder abnormal returns, 
prior research finds that firm and deal characteristics have a significant relation with bidder 
abnormal returns. Based on the literature,8 we therefore also incorporate a number of control 
variables in the analysis. Prior research suggests that the listing status of targets may affect 
bidder abnormal returns, and, following Fuller et al. (2002) and Rosen (2006), we classify 
deals into acquisitions of Public, Private, and Subsidiary firms. Public is a dummy equal to 
one for public target deals and Private a dummy equal to one for private deals (with 
Subsidiaries captured by the intercept in the regression analysis). Stock is a dummy equal to 
                                                          
7 Vitrue (2010) reports that Facebook activity peaks at 3pm, and is present after the closure of stock markets.  
8 Studies include those by Asquith et al. (1983), Travlos (1987), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Titman et al. (2004), Draper and Paudyal, (2006), and Danbolt and 
MacIver (2012).  
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one for deals with full payment in stock and Cash a dummy equal to one for deals with full 
cash offers (with Mixed Pay offers captured by the intercept). Larger transactions are likely 
to have a larger impact on the bidder, and we therefore control for the relative size of the 
target to the bidder. We incorporate a Relative Size dummy which is equal to one for deals 
belonging to the top quartile of relative size between bidder and target firms, and zero 
otherwise.  
Other bid characteristics controlled for are the size of the bidder (as captured by the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity, LnMV); the bidder’s book-to-market-ratio 
(BTMV); domestic versus cross-border acquisitions (with Domestic a dummy variable taking 
the value of one for domestic deals); whether the acquisition is focused or diversifying (with 
diversifying being a dummy variable equal to one where targets and bidders do not share the 
same first two-digit SIC code); whether the transaction is competitive or whether there is a 
single bidder for the target (with Competitive being a dummy equal to one for multiple 
bidders according to SDC); and for tender offers versus mergers (with Tender being a dummy 
equal to one for tender offers). Following e.g., Faccio and Masulis (2005) and Karampatsas et 
al. (2014), we use the pre-bid run-up in the bidder’s market-adjusted returns to capture 
possible market overvaluation of the bidder. CARs-252,-20 is the cumulative abnormal returns 
over the period from -252 to -20 days prior to each merger announcement. As financial 
strength and capital structure may affect the method of payment used (Karampatsas et al., 
2014), we incorporate DebtTA, which is long-term debt plus current liabilities to total assets, 
and CashFlow, which is measured as operating income before depreciation, interest expenses, 
taxes, and dividends to total assets.  
Table 1 shows summary descriptive statistics of sentiment and the share price reaction 
of bidders around their merger announcements. We find that close to half of the acquisitions 
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took place in the US (3,525 out of a total of 7,529 acquisitions in our sample). Due to the 
small number of acquisitions available in some countries, we present empirical results for all 
countries combined and, in a later section, for US and non-US acquisitions separately. In line 
with prior literature (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Draper and Paudyal, 2006), we find 
that the short-term wealth effect tends to be positive for bidders in acquisitions of private 
firms and negative in acquisitions of publicly listed targets. For example, the four-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are -0.7 and 2.0 percent for the sample as a whole for public and 
private target acquisitions, respectively. We also estimate the mean GNH for the equivalent 
interval period from the merger announcement day to three days after. With the exclusion of 
extreme positive days (such as “Happy Mother’s Day”), mean GNH tends to be negative, 
although there are some national variations, with India experiencing the lowest average GNH 
(-0.058) and Italy the highest (0.014) around the time of the acquisition announcements.9 Our 
descriptive statistics for GNH are similar to those reported by Siganos et al. (2014). In the 
cross-sectional regressions, standard errors are clustered by country (Petersen, 2009), and 
fixed effects by country are also included to control for such variations.    
[please insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 offers Pearson correlations of the variables used in the study. The correlation 
coefficient between the GNH variable and abnormal returns is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, offering the first indication of sentiment having a significant 
relation with bidder abnormal returns. In line with the literature (e.g., Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2003), abnormal returns are also related with the control variables used, and some of 
                                                          
9 It should be noted that the GNH is on average similar on bid and on non-bid dates, and in probit analysis of the 
relation between bid announcement and either current or past levels of GNH, we find no indication of the timing 
of bid announcements being related to the level of GNH. Given the time and effort involved in planning and 
executing takeover bids, it is unlikely that managers would time the announcements based on small variations in 
market sentiment.  
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the control variables are correlated. There is, however, no issue of collinearity (as the highest 
correlation coefficient is less than 0.48), and the significant correlations among the control 
variables are acceptable for the purpose of the study, since we are not focusing on the relation 
of each control variable with abnormal returns, but rather on whether GNH is related to 
bidder announcement returns after controlling for potential variables that are related with 
companies’ stock returns. The following section explores whether GNH is related with bidder 
announcement returns.  
[please insert Table 2 here] 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Sentiment and bidder announcement returns: Univariate results 
We first undertake univariate analysis to explore the relation between GNH and bidder 
announcement returns. Note that GNH and returns are measured over the same interval 
period between day 0 and +3 after each merger announcement day. We first rank mergers 
based on the level of GNH over the event window and then split the sample of acquisitions 
into quartiles. Quartiles, rather than e.g. deciles, are used to ensure that portfolio returns do 
not arrive from a small number of observations.  
Table 3 shows the cumulative abnormal portfolio returns around the merger 
announcements across different levels of GNH portfolios. We find that GNH is significantly 
related to bidder stock returns. For example, bidder abnormal returns are 2.06 and 0.92 
percent for high and low GNH portfolios, respectively, when analyzing the full sample of 
countries. The difference is economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Moving from high to lower GNH portfolios, mean returns for bidders for the overall sample 
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of all countries are as follows: 2.06%, 1.78%, 2.01%, and 0.92%. These results offer initial 
support for our main hypothesis that sentiment is related with bidder returns, with 
acquisitions undertaken on days with high market sentiment associated with higher 
announcement abnormal returns.   
[please insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.2 Sentiment and bidder announcement returns: Multivariate results 
Prior research on mergers and acquisitions highlights the impact of bid and firm 
characteristics on bidder returns, and we therefore undertake multivariate analysis to test 
whether the relation between sentiment and bidder CAR holds once we control for variables 
that may impact on bidder abnormal returns. We estimate OLS regressions with robust 
standard errors clustered by country, and country-fixed effects are included. The dependent 
variable is the four-day cumulative abnormal returns per firm (0,+3). The key independent 
variable is GNH in the contemporaneous period with that used for abnormal returns, and the 
following control variables are also employed: the logarithmic market cap of the bidder, 
public and private acquisition dummy variables (with subsidiaries captured by the intercept), 
stock and cash payment dummies (with mixed payment captured by the intercept), a relative 
size dummy for deals in the top quartile, book-to-market ratio, a domestic acquisition 
dummy, a diversified dummy based on whether the bidder and target firms do not share the 
same two-digit SIC code industries, a competitive bid dummy if there are multiple bidders, a 
tender offer dummy, the cumulative run-up returns prior to merger announcements (CARs-
252,-20), the ratio of debt to total assets, and cashflows. We include eight one-day lags (for days 
-8 to -1) of GNH to ensure that prior sentiment levels could not be used to predict the next 
period’s sentiment, and, similarly, eight-day lags of each country’s stock market returns to 
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control for potential reverse causality, with prior gains/losses in stock markets influencing 
investors’ happiness. Eight lags are selected, since in untabulated results we find that there is 
statistically significant daily autocorrelation for GNH up to a maximum of eight lags, and the 
same selection of lags are used for prior stock market returns, for consistency.10 The 
parameter coefficients of country dummies, and those on lags of GNH and on lags of stock 
market returns, are not reported for space considerations.      
Table 4 shows the results of the multivariate analysis. We find that sentiment remains 
positively related with bidder returns. Column (1) shows that the parameter coefficient on 
GNH is 0.120, with a p-value equal to 0.003, indicating that after controlling for other 
factors, a one percentage point increase in GNH is associated with a 0.120 percentage point 
increase in bidder cumulative abnormal returns. Note that bidder stock returns are in excess 
of the contemporaneous stock market returns, indicating that the relation reported in this 
study is beyond the stock market returns and sentiment relation previously reported in the 
literature. In untabulated results, we find that the parameter coefficient for GNH is 0.147 and 
0.267 when regressing GNH with stock market returns and bidder returns, respectively (both 
significant at the 1% level). Note that the difference between 0.267 and 0.147 is the bidder 
stock returns in excess of stock market returns reported earlier (0.120). The relation between 
bidder stock returns and sentiment is therefore much more prominent at the time of their bid 
announcement than the general relation between sentiment and stock returns reported in 
conventional behavioral studies. Our results are consistent with what we would expect if 
investors’ subconscious reaction to potential synergies and risks involved with mergers is 
associated with sentiment, with happy investors tending to overestimate potential synergies 
and/or underestimate the risks involved with the mergers.   
                                                          
10 In untabulated results, we also use five-day lags for both GNH and stock market returns to capture potential 
weekly cycles. Results remain very similar in alternative lag selections.  
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As a further test of whether the relation between sentiment and stock returns is 
particularly strong during acquisitions, when the value of bidders is arguably more uncertain 
than usual, we use the same model to test the relation between sentiment and share returns in 
a period prior to the bid announcement, when the forthcoming bid is still not known to 
investors. Column (2) of Table 4 shows the parameter coefficients when regressing bidder 
abnormal stock returns during the interval period between -12 and -10 days prior to each 
merger announcement on contemporaneous GNH and the same control variables. We find 
that the parameter coefficient for GNH for the -12 and -10 interval period is insignificant, 
highlighting the existence of the relation only during the merger announcement period. A 
Chow test (Chow, 1960) that compares the parameter coefficient for GNH between the pre-
bid and merger announcement periods, reported in Column (3) of Table 4, shows that the 
coefficient for GNH is significantly higher at the 1% level in the merger period.    
Note that the signs of the parameter coefficients for control variables are generally in 
line with prior literature (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Draper and Paudyal, 2006). We find bidder 
abnormal returns to be higher in acquisitions of subsidiaries than in acquisitions of private 
targets, with bidder abnormal returns particularly low in acquisitions of publicly listed 
targets. With the mix of public and private targets in the sample, it is not unexpected that we 
find bidder abnormal returns on average slightly higher in share than in cash financed 
acquisitions. Consistent with prior literature, we find bidder returns to be higher in tender 
offers than in mergers, but, contrary to expectations, also higher in competitive bidding 
contests.11 We find some evidence of reversal, with bidder abnormal returns being 
                                                          
11 Draper and Paudyal (2006) find that bidder returns depend on both the listing status of the target and the 
method of payment; they find returns to acquirers of publicly listed targets to be worse in share than in cash 
financed acquisitions, but that bidders earn higher abnormal returns when paying in stock than with cash in 
acquisitions of private targets.  
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significantly lower where there has been a substantial run-up in the bidder’s share price prior 
to the bid. Bidder returns are also influenced by gearing levels and cash flow balances.  
 [please insert Table 4 here] 
   
3.3 Is the relation between sentiment and bidder returns irrational? 
We next explore whether the relation between sentiment and bidder returns is the 
result of a short-term market overreaction. To test this, we explore the relation between 
sentiment and bidder announcement abnormal returns over the days following a merger 
announcement. If the relation between sentiment and bidder announcement returns is driven 
by an irrational reaction, the relation is expected to reverse as traders less susceptible to 
sentiment (such as merger arbitrageurs) take advantage of the market mispricing.  
Table 5 shows the parameter coefficients of GNH when we estimate the relation 
between GNH, as estimated previously in the interval period between 0 and +3 days, and its 
relation with bidder returns over the following +4 to +12 days after each merger 
announcement. Due to space considerations, we only report the parameter coefficients for 
GNH on each day, although all control variables used earlier are included in the regressions. 
We find that the relation of sentiment with bidder announcement returns is significantly 
negative on day +4 (-0.072 and significant at the 1% level), which is to an extent comparable, 
although slightly smaller than the initial over-reaction (0.120). The relation then remains 
mostly insignificant for the remaining lead days. Merger arbitrageurs trade heavily around 
merger announcements, and therefore the response to misevaluations due to sentiment is 
expected to be immediate. However, since professional investors are still prone to behavioral 
biases (Kaplanski and Levy, 2013; Kling and Gao, 2008; Gleijser and Heyndels, 2001), albeit 
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to a lesser extent than other market participants, a full recovery to the initial stock prices may 
not be expected to show up empirically.     
 [please insert Table 5 here] 
 
3.4 What drives the relation between sentiment and bidder returns? 
This section explores characteristics that drive the relation between sentiment and bidder 
returns. First, we hypothesize that the relation is more prominent in firms with a low 
percentage of shares owned by large blockholders, since smaller investors are likely to be 
more heavily influenced by sentiment (e.g., DeLong et al., 1990).12 Second, we hypothesize 
that the relation between sentiment and bidder returns is stronger within public deals, since 
there is a higher likelihood for the merger announcement to attract more attention in public 
deals. Third, we test whether the first two factors interact. If sentiment affects predominately 
private investors and deals with significant publicity, we expect the relation between 
sentiment and bidder returns to be particularly high in acquisitions of public targets by 
bidders with low levels of blockholder ownership. Fourth, we explore the influence of 
relative size on the magnitude of the sentiment and return relation. Larger deals can be 
expected to have a larger impact on the bidder, and therefore the sentiment and return relation 
should be more pronounced within large-size deals.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows the univariate results in sub-groups where a more/less 
pronounced relation with sentiment is expected. Blockholder captures the total percentage of 
                                                          
12 Note that we control for the size of the acquirer in multivariate analysis to ensure that our results are not 
driven by blockholder ownership being negatively correlated with firm size.   
21 
 
shares held by strategic investors who each hold a large stake.13 To explore whether GNH has 
a stronger relation with abnormal returns for companies with higher proportions of smaller 
investors, who may be more susceptible to behavioral biases than larger and more 
sophisticated investors, we use a Low Blockholder dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if blockholder ownership is less than 5%, and zero otherwise.14 We also split the sample 
into high and low relative size groups based on quartiles. We first identify the top and bottom 
portfolio for each characteristic and then rank them based on GNH.  
Results support the developed hypotheses. In particular, we find that the relation 
between GNH and bidder returns is more pronounced in companies with low rather than high 
blockholder ownership. The difference in returns between high and low GNH by bidders with 
low levels of blockholder ownership is 1.45 percentage points and significant at the 1% level, 
compared to an insignificant 0.39 percentage points in acquisitions by bidders with 
counterpart high levels of blockholder ownership.15 The difference in returns between high 
and low GNH deals is also 2.81% and significant at the 1% significance level for public 
deals, and 0.75% and insignificant for private deals. The difference between high and low 
GNH for public targets of low blockholder ownership deals is a significant 3.23 percentage 
points, while we find no relation between GNH and bidder returns in acquisitions of private 
targets. Finally, the high minus low GNH difference in returns is 3.08% for high relative size 
transactions, and significant at the 1% level, and an insignificant 0.56% for low relative size 
transactions.  
                                                          
13 Regulations vary slightly between countries as to what stakes have to be reported to the stock exchange. For 
example, in the US stakes above 5% have to be reported, while in the UK the threshold is 3%. Given the 
different reporting requirements in different countries, we use a 5% cut-off to identify blockholder ownership. 
14 In untabulated results, we find that alternative blockholder ownership definitions, such as using a dummy 
variable that equals one for ownership of less than 10%, 15%, and 20%, offers similar empirical results.  
15 In untabulated results, we also test the trading volume around the announcement of the deals and find that 
firms with both high and low blockholder ownership experience positive and significant abnormal trading 
activity around merger announcements. The difference in the relation between GNH and bidder announcement 
returns between the two groups is therefore unlikely to be driven by thin trading. 
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For completeness, and to ensure that sentiment is related with stock returns, we also 
explore whether the relation between GNH and bidder abnormal returns also varies with the 
method of payment and the size of the bidder. Univariate results in relation to high and low 
GNH levels on the following subgroups: cash, stock and mixed methods of payment, and 
large and small size of bidding firms, are reported in Panel B of Table 6. We have no 
expectation as to whether the relation between investor sentiment and bidder abnormal 
returns will vary with the method of payment or firm size. We find that the relation between 
GNH and stock returns overall holds across the alternative subgroups. The difference in 
abnormal returns between high and low GNH states is, however, not quite statistically 
significant in stock financed deals (p-value equal to 0.119), although the coefficient is 
economically significant at 2.66%. The lack of significance may be attributable to the 
relatively small number of stock financed deals available.  
 
[please insert Table 6 here] 
Table 7 shows the multivariate results, focusing on blockholder, target status, and the 
relative size of the acquisitions that we earlier developed hypotheses for. We construct 
dummy variables for each group of interest and interact them with GNH. We find that our 
univariate results hold within multivariate analysis. In regression 1, we find the absence of a 
blockholder to have a small and insignificant relation with bidder abnormal returns. However, 
more importantly, the large positive parameter coefficient (0.281) for the interactive variable 
LowBlock*GNH (significant at the 1% level) indicates that the relation between GNH and 
bidder abnormal returns is more pronounced for the group of bidders where blockholders 
own a smaller fraction of shares. This is consistent with our prediction that smaller and 
arguably less sophisticated investors may be more susceptible to the influence of sentiment.  
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The positive parameter coefficient (0.276) for the interactive variable Public*GNH 
(also significant at the 1% level) in the second regression supports the argument that the 
influence of GNH on bidder returns is more pronounced for acquisitions of public target 
firms. In the third regression we look at the interaction between these two effects. As 
predicted, we find the relation of sentiment to be particularly large (coefficient of 0.477 and 
significant at the 10% level) in acquisitions of public targets by bidders with low blockholder 
ownership. Note that when we interact LowBlock*Private*GNH and LowBlock*Private, 
both parameter coefficients are insignificant, highlighting the significance of the public 
dummy on the magnitude of the relation between sentiment and bidder stock returns.  
In the final regression, we study the relation between relative size and bidder stock 
returns. Not only do we find bidder abnormal returns to be higher where the acquisition is 
large relative to the size of the target (regression coefficient of 0.021 and significant at the 
1% level), but the relation between sentiment and bidder stock returns (as captured by the 
interactive variable RelSizeHigh*GNH) is also significantly higher in acquisitions of 
relatively large targets. The regression coefficient of 0.462 is again significant at the 1% 
level. This is consistent with our expectations of a multiplier effect, with any error in target 
valuation by investors (overestimation of synergies or underestimation of risks) associated 
with sentiment biases having a stronger relation with bidder returns the larger the relative size 
of the target.  
 [please insert Table 7 here] 
            
3.5 Results for US and non-US mergers 
Results above are estimated for the pooled sample of all seventeen countries. Due to the 
importance of the US market in global M&A activity and the availability of an alternative 
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daily proxy of sentiment for this market, we re-estimate prior multivariate results for the sub-
sample of US acquisitions, and the remaining sub-sample of non-US acquisitions.16 However, 
there are also reasons to expect the relation between sentiment and bidder returns to vary 
between markets, particularly with regard to public deals, where we would expect different 
results in US versus non-US mergers.17 We hypothesize above that mergers with public 
targets experience a more pronounced relation with sentiment due to media coverage that 
particularly influences the investment decisions of small investors. However, the depth of 
media coverage of a topic may vary significantly from one country to another. Wu (2000) 
compares news coverage of the same international news within 38 countries, and finds that 
US coverage captures news by far the most comprehensively. US media is found to capture 
18% of the media space, with France, in second place, having merely 9%. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that the relation between sentiment and bidder stock returns is more pronounced 
in acquisitions of US public targets than in acquisitions of public firms in other markets. Note 
that the control variables used in this section are the same as those used in the multivariate 
analysis above, but we only report the parameter coefficients of interest for space 
considerations. 
          Table 8 shows the results for the relation between US-GNH and bidder announcement 
returns as well as the results for characteristics found earlier to be related with the strength of 
the relation between key variables under study. We find that US results are relatively similar 
to those found for the full sample. US-GNH is positively related with returns (0.115), 
although slightly statistically insignificant, as shown in regression 1. The relation between 
US-GNH and returns is more prominent within firms with a low percentage of blockholder 
                                                          
16 In untabulated results, we find that US univariate results show the same trends in line with reported 
multivariate results.     
17 The limited number of mergers in several countries also restricts the extent to which detailed cross-country 
comparisons can be undertaken.  
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ownership (regression 2), in acquisitions of public targets (regression 3), when the two 
characteristics are interacted (regression 4), and in high relative size acquisitions (regression 
5).  
  [please insert Table 8 here] 
An alternative daily sentiment index is available for the US – the Gallup Economic 
Confidence index. We use this to explore whether our results hold when using an alternative 
daily sentiment index. Note that the sample period is shorter than in the main analysis, as 
Gallup’s Index data commence in January 2008 (while GNH goes back to September 2007). 
In short, the Gallup Index is calculated based on phone interviews with 1,500 Americans 
aged 18 or over, during which interviewees are asked to rate their expectations for the future. 
In untabulated results, we find that the Pearson correlation between US-Gallup and US-GNH 
is 0.390 and significant at the 1% level, giving the first indication that similar results may be 
obtained for both indexes. Table 9 shows multivariate results when using US-Gallup. We find 
that with the use of US-Gallup, we arrive at qualitatively similar conclusions to those 
obtained using US-GNH, showing that our previous results are not driven by the use of the 
GNH proxy. In particular, we find that there is a positive relation between US-Gallup and 
bidder announcement returns. The parameter coefficient on US-Gallup is 0.055, which is 
significant at the 1% level. The relation between US-Gallup and bidder returns is also more 
prominent for bidders with low blockholder ownership, in acquisitions of public targets, in 
the interaction of low ownership and acquisition of public target firms, and in high relative 
target size deals.  
  [please insert Table 9 here] 
 We further explore non-US results in Table 10. In line with results for the US and the 
full sample of countries, NonUS-GNH is positively related with returns (0.110) and 
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significant at the 5% level. Also, the relation between NonUS-GNH and returns is more 
prominent within firms with a low percentage of blockholder ownership, and in high relative 
size acquisitions. However, the parameter coefficients regarding acquisitions of public targets 
are insignificant, possibly due to the lower level of media coverage of financial news in less 
developed countries in relation to the US market (Wu, 2000). In untabulated results, we 
support that sentiment is related with bidder abnormal announcement returns more 
prominently in public targets of other highly developed countries (in addition to the US 
market), such as within a number of European countries. These results offer an international 
dimension of the significance of media coverage in public acquisitions.  
[please insert Table 10 here] 
 
4. Conclusion 
While a number of factors have been previously put forward to explain bidder returns, little 
empirical investigation has been undertaken on the significance of behavioral aspects. We use 
a direct measure of daily sentiment data available from Facebook across seventeen 
international markets to capture sentiment on the days surrounding mergers and explore its 
relation with bidder announcement abnormal returns. We argue that investors are 
subconsciously influenced by their sentiment, which may bias their estimation of expected 
synergies and risks from mergers; therefore, sentiment is expected to be related with bidder 
announcement returns.  
Prior literature (e.g., Siganos et al., 2014) has found a positive relation between 
sentiment and the general stock market index, and we similarly find such a relation. 
However, our study goes beyond the conventional relation between sentiment and stock 
returns by focusing on the relation between sentiment and bidders’ abnormal returns at the 
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time of the bid announcement. By controlling for the ‘normal’ relation between sentiment and 
share returns, we thus capture the extent to which the relation between sentiment and share 
returns is different during acquisition periods compared to other times. Given that 
acquisitions are generally large investments, any behavioral biases in investors’ assessment of 
synergies or risks may be expected to have a significant impact on firm value. We find 
empirical evidence of sentiment being positively related with bidder announcement abnormal 
returns. The relation analyzed in this study goes beyond the conventional relation between 
sentiment and stock market returns reported by earlier behavioral studies, since bidder stock 
returns are market-adjusted. The relation is only present during the merger period, while the 
relation is insignificant when testing within a period prior to merger announcements. We also 
find that the relation between sentiment and bidder returns is higher for bidders with low 
levels of blockholder ownership, consistent with predictions that smaller investors and less 
informed traders are more susceptible to behavioral biases, especially in acquisitions which 
are more likely to attract significant media attention. The effect is also larger in acquisitions 
of public targets within US markets with significant media coverage, and in acquisitions of 
relatively large targets. Our evidence suggests that the relation between sentiment and bidder 
abnormal returns is the outcome of irrational behavior. Sentiment appears to influence 
investors’ assessment of expected synergies and risks involved in an acquisition. We 
conclude that sentiment is an important factor to control for when exploring bidder 
announcement abnormal returns. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the number of mergers, the sentiment level (GNH), and the percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) per country in the 
sample. Sentiment and cumulative returns are estimated over the four-day period from the merger announcement day to three days after (0,+3). N indicates the number of 
merger transactions analyzed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
     CARs(0,+3)  CARs(0,+3)  Public  Private 
 GNH(0,+3) N p-value  Average p-value Median  CARs(0,+3) N p-value  CARs(0,+3) N p-value 
All -0.013*** 7529 0.000  0.017*** 0.000 0.007  -0.007** 1059 0.029  0.020*** 3852 0.000 
                
Argentina -0.007 14 0.432  0.011 0.614 0.027  -0.004 3 0.970  -0.004 6 0.890 
Australia -0.009*** 733 0.000  0.033*** 0.000 0.013  0.000 102 0.971  0.042*** 397 0.000 
Austria -0.014*** 31 0.000  0.005 0.585 -0.002  0.004 3 0.935  0.002 14 0.813 
Belgium -0.005* 70 0.055  0.015*** 0.006 0.010  0.011 6 0.741  0.016** 34 0.032 
Canada -0.012*** 1299 0.000  0.023*** 0.000 0.005  -0.010 283 0.149  0.033*** 606 0.000 
Germany -0.003* 119 0.088  0.009 0.118 0.012  -0.007 20 0.577  0.004 48 0.705 
India -0.058*** 23 0.000  0.020 0.211 0.013  0.034 2 0.552  0.016 14 0.487 
Ireland-Rep -0.025*** 62 0.000  0.015 0.231 0.019  -0.041 2 0.578  0.010 33 0.493 
Italy 0.014*** 127 0.000  0.003 0.451 0.002  -0.029** 11 0.028  0.003 53 0.725 
Mexico -0.006 16 0.257  0.017 0.238 0.016  0.018 5 0.571  -0.002 5 0.899 
Netherlands -0.016*** 91 0.000  0.002 0.783 -0.003  -0.026 19 0.157  0.001 36 0.892 
New Zealand -0.013*** 28 0.000  0.022 0.266 0.000  -0.027 3 0.556  0.048 13 0.139 
Singapore -0.009*** 120 0.000  0.012 0.169 0.003  0.032 6 0.395  0.023 48 0.136 
South Africa -0.016*** 49 0.000  0.028*** 0.008 0.006  0.071* 5 0.084  0.029 24 0.100 
Spain -0.008* 68 0.050  -0.004 0.455 -0.004  -0.026 10 0.110  -0.009 25 0.424 
UK -0.014*** 1152 0.000  0.016*** 0.000 0.010  -0.003 101 0.753  0.016*** 695 0.000 
US -0.016*** 3525 0.000  0.013*** 0.000 0.007  -0.008* 477 0.091  0.014*** 1801 0.000 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
This table shows Pearson correlations of the variables used in the study. CARs and GNH are the percentage cumulative abnormal returns and the sentiment in the interval 
period between the merger announcement and three days after (0,+3). LnMV is the natural log of the market capitalization of bidders on the merger announcement, Public is a 
dummy equal to one for public target deals, Private is a dummy equal to one for private deals, Stock is a dummy equal to one for stock payments, Cash is a dummy equal to 
one for cash-offered deals, RelSize is a dummy equal to one for deals in the top quartile of relative size between bidder and target firms, BTMV is the book-to-market-ratio, 
Domestic is a dummy variable taking the value of one for domestic deals, Diversified is a dummy variable equal to one where targets and bidders have different two-digit SIC 
codes, Competitive is a dummy equal to one for multiple bidders according to SDC, Tender is a dummy equal to one for tender offers, CARs-252,-20 is the cumulative excess 
abnormal returns prior to each merger announcement, DebtTA is long-term debt plus current liabilities to total assets, and Cashflow is operating income before depreciation, 
interest expenses, taxes, and dividends to total assets. Correlations shown are for the full sample of seventeen countries *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CARs(0,+3) 
 
 
 
            (2) GNH(0,+3) 0.030** 
 
 
            (3) LnMV -0.171*** -0.013  
            (4) Public -0.095** -0.000 0.154*** 
            (5) Private 0.030** -0.034*** -0.192*** -0.414*** 
           (6) Stock 0.044*** 0.006 -0.229*** 0.340*** -0.093*** 
          (7) Cash -0.028** -0.014 0.212*** 0.004 -0.084*** -0.232*** 
         (8) RelSize 0.123*** 0.005 -0.210*** -0.003 0.026** 0.113*** -0.051*** 
        (9) BTMV 0.067*** 0.038*** -0.211*** 0.026** -0.026** 0.108*** -0.058*** 0.269*** 
       (10) Domestic -0.016 -0.035*** -0.081*** 0.069*** 0.014 0.064*** -0.036*** 0.007 0.035*** 
      (11) Diversified 0.001 0.021* 0.031*** -0.123*** 0.062*** -0.093*** 0.032*** 0.006 -0.020* 0.013 
     (12) Competitive 0.001 0.022* 0.060*** 0.198*** -0.084*** 0.045*** 0.024** -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.033*** 
    (13) Tender -0.033*** -0.002 0.123*** 0.484*** -0.200*** 0.073*** 0.107*** -0.010 -0.016 0.016 -0.026** 0.246*** 
   (14) CARs-252,-20 -0.052*** 0.049*** 0.160*** -0.030** 0.028** -0.069*** 0.031** -0.071*** -0.161*** -0.039*** -0.011 0.002 0.018 
   (15) DebtTA 0.035*** 0.005 -0.016 -0.014 0.005 -0.006 -0.010 0.014 -0.009 0.019 0.024** -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 
 (16) CashFlow -0.059*** 0.010 0.076*** 0.016 -0.012 -0.025** 0.017 -0.030** 0.001 0.003 -0.018 0.004 0.010 -0.004 -0.575*** 
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Table 3. GNH and CARs – Univariate results 
This table shows the univariate results regarding the relation of sentiment (GNH) with cumulative returns of 
bidders estimated over the four-day period from the merger announcement date to three days after (0,+3). We 
first rank mergers on sentiment level and then generate quartile portfolios. High (low) sentiment is the top 
(bottom) quartile. N indicates the number of mergers available. P-values are shown in parentheses. Results 
shown are for the full sample of seventeen countries. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 CARs(0,+3) 
High GNH(0,+3) 2.06*** 
 (0.000) 
N 1882 
  
2 GNH(0,+3) 1.78*** 
 (0.000) 
N 1880 
  
3 GNH(0,+3) 2.01*** 
 (0.000) 
N 1879 
  
Low GNH(0,+3) 0.92*** 
 (0.000) 
N 1882 
  
High-Low 1.15*** 
 (0.001) 
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Table 4. GNH and CARs – Multivariate results 
Column (1) of this table explores whether the relation between sentiment and bidder returns holds after 
adjusting for a number of control variables, and column (2) shows the extent to which the relation is present 
prior to the merger announcement period. The dependent variable in column (1) is the percentage cumulative 
abnormal returns estimated from the merger announcement day to three days after (0,+3), while in column (2) it 
is from -12 days to -10 prior to the merger announcement. The main independent variable under consideration is 
sentiment (GNH), which is estimated in the interval period between 0 and +3 days after merger announcements 
in column (1), and -12 and -10 days prior to merger announcements in column (2). Column (3) shows the Chow 
test result on the statistically significant difference between columns (1) and (2).  Explanatory variables are as 
defined in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by country. Country dummies, and eight lags on sentiment and 
on stock market returns, are included. P-values are shown in parentheses. N indicates the number of 
observations. Results shown are for the full sample of seventeen countries. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CARs(0,+3) CARs(-12,-10)     Diff 
GNH(0,+3) 0.120***   
 (0.003)   
GNH(-12,-10)  0.027  
  (0.200)  
Difference GNH   0.093*** 
   (0.008) 
LnMV -0.015*** 0.001  
 (0.000) (0.793)  
Public -0.034*** 0.004*  
 (0.000) (0.068)  
Private -0.010*** 0.001  
 (0.000) (0.650)  
Stock 0.008* 0.010**  
 (0.083) (0.024)  
Cash 0.002 0.000  
 (0.375) (0.887)  
RelSize 0.002* -0.002  
 (0.092) (0.212)  
BTMV 0.001 0.001**  
 (0.526) (0.041)  
Domestic -0.009 0.001  
 (0.124) (0.799)  
Diversified -0.001 -0.003**  
 (0.559) (0.047)  
Competitive 0.025* -0.003  
 (0.074) (0.359)  
Tender 0.013** -0.002  
 (0.022) (0.542)  
CARs-252,-20 -0.005** -0.001  
 (0.040) (0.874)  
DebtTA 0.002*** -0.004***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
CashFlow 0.001*** -0.001***  
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Constant 0.079*** -0.013***  
 (0.000) (0.006)  
Country Dummies Yes Yes  
Lagged Sentiment Yes Yes  
Lagged Market Returns Yes Yes  
N 6493 6378  
adj. R-sq 0.070 0.029  
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Table 5. The relation of sentiment with lead bidder announcement returns 
This table explores within a multivariate analysis the relation of sentiment with bidder cumulative abnormal 
returns after merger announcements (0,+3) as well as from day +4 to day +12 after merger announcements. The 
dependent variable is the percentage cumulative returns (CARs). We also incorporate the control variables, in 
line with the prior multivariate table (Table 4), but due to space considerations only the parameter coefficient of 
sentiment (GNH) is reported. Country dummies, and eight lags on sentiment and on stock market returns, are 
included. P-values are shown in parentheses. Results shown are for the full sample of seventeen countries. * and 
*** indicate significance at the 10 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Days CARs(0,+3) 
(0,+3) 0.120*** 
 (0.003) 
+4 -0.072*** 
 (0.000) 
+5 -0.000 
 (0.990) 
+6 -0.002 
 (0.917) 
+7 0.035 
 (0.267) 
+8 -0.012 
 (0.520) 
+9 0.009 
 (0.560) 
+10 0.027 
 (0.215) 
+11 0.018 
 (0.193) 
+12 -0.032* 
 (0.062) 
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Table 6. Sub-Group Analysis: Univariate results 
This table shows the univariate results regarding the relation of sentiment (GNH) with cumulative abnormal 
returns of bidders for a number of subgroups. In Panel A we explore the percentage of blockholder ownership in 
a firm, the target status, and the relative size between bidder and target firms, while in Panel B we report results 
for the method of payment and the market capitalization (size) of bidders. Blockholder ownership indicates the 
percentage of shares held by strategic shareholders owning 5 percent or more. Targets may be private or public 
firms. We first identify the top and bottom quartile per country for each characteristic and then rank them based 
on the level of sentiment. GNH and returns are estimated over the four-day period from the merger 
announcement to three days after (0,+3). N indicates the number of mergers available. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. Results shown are for the full sample of seventeen countries. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Blockholder Ownership, Target Status, and Relative Size   
 
Blockholder Target Status Low Blockholder  RelSize 
 
Low High Public Private Public Private High Low 
High GNH(0,+3) 1.22*** 1.59*** -0.17 2.23*** -0.59 0.95** 4.80*** 0.66*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.775) (0.000) (0.302) (0.045) (0.000) (0.003) 
N 568 1092 264 963 106 256 469 469 
         Low GNH(0,+3) -0.23 1.21*** -2.98*** 1.48*** -3.82*** -0.32 1.71** 0.10 
 
(0.590) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.642) (0.025) (0.730) 
N 567 1093 264 962 106 256 469 468 
         High-Low 1.45*** 0.39 2.81*** 0.75 3.23*** 1.27 3.08*** 0.56 
 
(0.007) (0.334) (0.002) (0.127) (0.006) (0.130) (0.002) (0.136) 
Panel B: Method of Payment and Bidder Size Expectation 
   
 
Method of Payment Size 
   
 
Cash Stock Mixed Large Small 
         High GNH(0,+3) 1.34*** 4.73*** 1.93*** 0.84*** 5.07*** 
   
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   N 564 209 1108 469 469 
   
         Low GNH(0,+3) 0.45 2.07 1.05*** -0.50 2.63*** 
   
 
(0.163) (0.107) (0.001) (0.108) (0.001) 
   N 564 209 1107 469 468 
   
         High-Low 0.88** 2.66 0.88** 1.34*** 2.44** 
   
 
(0.041) (0.119) (0.030) (0.001) (0.019) 
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Table 7. Sub-Group Analysis: Multivariate results 
This table explores within a multivariate analysis the relation of sentiment with bidder cumulative abnormal 
returns within alternative subgroups: low levels of strategic blockholder ownership, public targets, and high 
relative size of target to bidder mergers. The dependent variable is the percentage cumulative returns (CARs) 
estimated over the four-day period from the merger announcement to three days after (0,+3). Other explanatory 
variables are as defined in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by country. Country dummies, and eight lags 
on sentiment and on stock market returns, are included. P-values are shown in parentheses. N indicates the 
number of observations. Results shown are for the full sample of seventeen countries. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) 
GNH(0,+3) -0.028 0.081** 0.011 0.021 
 (0.576) (0.012) (0.846) (0.663) 
LowBlock 0.002  -0.001  
 (0.172)  (0.876)  
LowBlock*GNH(0,+3) 0.281***    
 (0.003)    
Public*GNH(0,+3)  0.276***   
  (0.002)   
LowBlock*Public   0.007  
   (0.422)  
LowBlock*Private   -0.002  
   (0.851)  
LowBlock*Public*GNH(0,+3)   0.477*  
   (0.065)  
LowBlock*Private*GNH(0,+3)   0.130  
   (0.521)  
RelSizeHigh    0.021*** 
    (0.000) 
RelSizeHigh*GNH(0,+3)    0.462*** 
    (0.004) 
LnMV -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) 
Stock 0.005 0.008* 0.005 0.007 
 (0.491) (0.085) (0.487) (0.116) 
Cash 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.182) (0.386) (0.183) (0.245) 
RelSize 0.006** 0.002* 0.006** 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.092) (0.013) (0.201) 
BTMV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.782) (0.525) (0.775) (0.567) 
Domestic -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.176) (0.127) (0.162) (0.113) 
Diversified -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.552) (0.542) (0.545) (0.768) 
Competitive 0.018* 0.024* 0.017* 0.025* 
 (0.058) (0.088) (0.065) (0.071) 
Tender 0.014*** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.014** 
 (0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.010) 
CARs-252,-20 -0.002 -0.005** -0.002 -0.004** 
 (0.314) (0.041) (0.322) (0.048) 
DebtTA -0.004*** 0.002*** -0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CashFlow -0.003*** 0.001*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.066*** 0.078*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Sentiment Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Market Returns Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5928 6493 5928 6493 
adj. R-sq 0.068 0.070 0.067 0.074 
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Table 8. GNH and CAR: US results 
This table explores within a multivariate framework whether the relation of sentiment with bidder returns holds 
within the sample of US mergers. The regression is estimated for the whole US sample as well as for subgroups 
based on strategic blockholder ownership, target status, the interaction between low ownership and the target 
status, and the relative size between targets and bidders. The dependent variable is the percentage cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) estimated over the four-day period from the merger announcement day to three days 
after (0,+3). Explanatory variables are the same as in Table 7. P-values are shown in parentheses. N indicates 
the number of observations. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 CARs(0,+3
 
CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) 
US-GNH(0,+3) 0.115 -0.003 0.052 0.045 -0.013 
 (0.198) (0.973) (0.584) (0.641) (0.897) 
LowBlock  0.004  -0.008  
  (0.306)  (0.122)  
LowBlock*US-GNH(0,+3)  0.490***    
  (0.003)    
Public*US-GNH(0,+3)   0.415**   
   (0.044)   
LowBlock*Public    0.024**  
    (0.018)  
LowBlock*Private    0.011  
    (0.133)  
LowBlock*Public*US-GNH(0,+3)    0.736**  
    (0.015)  
LowBlock*Private*US-GNH(0,+3)    0.401*  
    (0.094)  
RelSizeHigh     0.020*** 
     (0.000) 
RelSizeHigh*US-GNH(0,+3)     0.570*** 
     (0.001) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Merger Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Sentiment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Market Returns Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3063 3031 3063 3031 3063 
adj. R-sq 0.114 0.122 0.115 0.121 0.118 
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Table 9. US results with the use of the Gallup Economic Confidence Index 
This table explores within a multivariate framework the relation of sentiment, as proxied by the Gallup US 
Economic Confidence Index, with bidder returns within the sample of US mergers. The dependent variable is 
the percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) estimated over the four-day period from the merger 
announcement to three days after (0,+3). Explanatory variables are the same as in Table 7. P-values are shown 
in parentheses. N indicates the number of observations. Gallup’s data commence on January 2008. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 CARs(0,
 
CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) 
US-Gallup(0,+3) 0.055**
 
0.035* 0.030* 0.043** 0.036** 
 (0.001) (0.082) (0.087) (0.018) (0.045) 
LowBlock  0.017*  -0.007  
  (0.099)  (0.214)  
LowBlock*US-Gallup(0,+3)  0.056**    
  (0.039)    
Public*US-Gallup(0,+3)   0.168***   
   (0.000)   
LowBlock*Public    0.063***  
    (0.003)  
LowBlock*Private    0.011  
    (0.426)  
LowBlock*Public*US-Gallup(0,+3)    0.147***  
    (0.008)  
LowBlock*Private*US-Gallup(0,+3)    0.023  
    (0.507)  
RelSizeHigh     0.043*** 
     (0.000) 
RelSizeHigh*US-Gallup(0,+3)     0.082*** 
     (0.010) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Merger Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Sentiment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Market Returns Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2786 2763 2786 2763 2786 
adj. R-sq 0.127 0.130 0.132 0.131 0.131 
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Table 10 GNH and CAR: Non-US results 
This table explores within a multivariate framework whether the relation of sentiment with bidder returns holds 
within the remaining countries when excluding US mergers (NonUS). The regression is estimated for the 
NonUS sample as well as for subgroups based on strategic blockholder ownership, target status, the interaction 
between low ownership and the target status, and the relative size between targets and bidders. The dependent 
variable is the percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) estimated over the four-day period from the 
merger announcement to three days after (0,+3). Explanatory variables are the same as in Table 7. P-values are 
shown in parentheses. N indicates the number of observations. Results shown are for the sample of sixteen 
countries. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) CARs(0,+3) 
NonUS-GNH(0,+3) 0.110** -0.107 0.085* -0.053 0.037 
 (0.046) (0.212) (0.062) (0.569) (0.576) 
LowBlock  0.001  0.006  
  (0.564)  (0.220)  
LowBlock*NonUS-GNH(0,+3)  0.211*    
  (0.072)    
Public*NonUS-GNH(0,+3)   0.193   
   (0.243)   
LowBlock*Public    -0.005  
    (0.549)  
LowBlock*Private    -0.013  
    (0.175)  
LowBlock*Public*NonUS-GNH(0,+3)    0.418  
    (0.361)  
LowBlock*Private*NonUS-GNH(0,+3)    -0.029  
    (0.855)  
RelSizeHigh     0.015*** 
     (0.005) 
RelSizeHigh*NonUS-GNH(0,+3)     0.335* 
     (0.055) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Merger Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Sentiment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged Market Returns Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3430 2897 3430 2897 3430 
adj. R-sq 0.061 0.050 0.061 0.050 0.063 
 
 
